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rms. We examine whether initial
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1. Introduction
Most, but not all, entrepreneurs recognize that nancing is one of their greatest ob-
stacles when starting their businesses. In fact, entrepreneurs often face diculties in
raising sucient funds from capital markets. Because of the limited access to capital
markets, some entrepreneurs are obliged to start their businesses with insucient
capital, and these businesses are then more susceptible to high rates of failure within
a short period. In this respect, it has proven eective in improving initial nancial
conditions for rm survival. For this reason, some policy makers and scholars often
emphasize the need for public support to improve initial nancial conditions, which
may result in promoting successful new businesses. However, little attention has
been paid to how initial nancial conditions aect the post-entry performance of
rms, and their impact on rm survival and exit is far from being well understood.
Using a survival analysis approach, this paper investigates the impact of initial
nancial conditions on the post-entry performance of rms. We examine whether
initial nancial conditions aect the duration of survival among start-up rms in
Japan, distinguishing between failure and merger. We provide evidence that start-
up rms that rely more on equity than debt nancing are less likely to fail within a
shorter period, but nd little evidence that initial equity size has a signicant eect
on the likelihood of failure. Moreover, we nd the negative eect of equity nancing
on the likelihood of failure to be greater for start-up rms founded following the
abolition of regulations governing a minimum paid-in capital requirement. Further-
more, the results reveal that start-up rms with larger initial equity are more likely
to exit through merger. Overall, the ndings suggest that initial capital structure is
a critical determinant of exit route and this implies that initial nancial conditions
determine the fate of start-up rms.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the
research background, including a literature review and hypotheses development.
Section 3 explains the data and method used in the paper. Section 4 presents the
estimation results. Finally, we provide some concluding remarks.
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2. Research background and hypotheses development
2.1. Financing of start-up rms
As Berger and Udell (1998) stated, small businesses are thought of as having a nan-
cial growth cycle in which nancial needs and options change as the business grows,
gains further experience, and becomes less informationally opaque. In practice, most
start-up rms rely on internal sources of start-up nance, which primarily comprise
the personal wealth of the founders (entrepreneurs) and that of family and friends
(e.g., Storey and Greene, 2010). Moreover, initial equity nancing usually tends
to be restricted, with only internal suppliers of capital. Therefore, start-up rms
with a greater demand must rely on external suppliers of capital, such as banks. In
particular, bank loans for start-up rms are common in many countries, including
Japan, where private equity investment by venture capital and angel investors is not
yet fully developed.
If capital markets are perfect, rms with growth potential should be able to raise
sucient funds. However, in reality, capital markets are far from perfect, such that
even if an entrepreneur has a good ability to expand the business, the entrepreneur
cannot necessarily obtain sucient funds. This situation arises because of informa-
tion asymmetries between entrepreneurs and external suppliers of capital, such as
banks. As a result, the costs of external suppliers of capital become higher because
transaction costs arise more commonly for external suppliers of capital. In addi-
tion, information asymmetries invite adverse selection and moral hazard problems
in capital markets, which generate agency costs, in addition to monitoring costs.
Accordingly, although rms may prefer to rely on internal rather than external sup-
pliers of capital to reduce the cost of nancing, at least some are obliged to use other
nancial sources once they exhaust funds from internal suppliers of capital.
For the most part, start-up rms, which are the focus of this paper, have a
shorter operating history, and lack a nancial track record, when compared with in-
cumbent rms. For these rms, agency costs tend to be higher because information
asymmetries are more sever between entrepreneurs and external suppliers of capital.
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Therefore, external suppliers of capital, such as banks, require higher risk premiums
to start-up rms, which results in a signicant increase in the cost of nancing. As
a result, some start-up rms with insucient capital must use external nancing at
a higher cost.
When raising funds from external suppliers of capital, rms generally face the
decision of issuing debt and/or equity. Generally, the combination of debt and eq-
uity rms use to nance is called capital structure. As Leary and Roberts (2005)
argued, rms strive to maintain an optimal capital structure that balances the costs
and benets associated with varying degrees of nancial leverage. Traditional ar-
guments suggest that rms choose an optimal capital structure by trading o the
benets of nancing, such as tax reductions, against the cost of nancial distress.1
This is because while debt nancing creates a tax shield for the rm, it also increases
the likelihood of bankruptcy, which induces the cost of nancial distress. Accord-
ingly, to remain solvent, rms would typically use equity rather than debt nancing.
Not surprisingly, debt nancing generates interest payments, which often place
a nancial burden on start-up rms beyond their expectations. This is because
start-up rms need time to generate operating prots by getting their businesses on
track. Although external suppliers of capital may be able to allow a moratorium
on payment, they usually hesitate to extend repayment for start-up rms that do
not have a long operating history. Therefore, start-up rms that rely more on debt
nancing are more likely to exit the market sooner. Unfortunately, there has been
relatively little research into the capital structure of start-up rms. An investigation
of the impact of initial nancial conditions will provide a better understanding of
how start-up rms raise their initial capital and survive in the market.
2.2. Post-entry performance and exit routes
The post-entry performance of rms has been addressed in a rich stream of litera-
ture.2 As a benchmark argument, Gibrat's law states that rm growth is indepen-
1For more discussion on capital structure, see, for example, Titman and Wessels (1988) and
Hovakimian et al. (2001).
2For more discussion on the post-entry performance of rms, see, for example, Parker (2009)
and Storey and Greene (2010).
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dent of size. While a large number of studies have tested Gibrat's law by empirically
investigating the relationship between rm growth and size, some studies have es-
timated the determinants of rm survival in addition to rm growth (e.g., Evans,
1987). For the most part, these estimations can avoid selection bias because rm exit
relates to lower growth rates. Besides, as survival is a precondition for rm growth,
rms that survive in the market may attract entrepreneurs and initial investors.
The existing literature has explored how some factors aect rm survival in
the market. To summarize these factors, Storey and Greene (2010) proposed ve
approaches: gambler's ruin, population ecology, resource-based theory (view), util-
ity, and entrepreneurial learning.3 In the resource-based view, the availability of
resources and capabilities, rather than the environment, is a central focus of the
post-entry performance of rms. In this respect, a deciency of both nancial and
human resources decreases the likelihood of rm survival.
There are many arguments concerning the post-entry performance of rms. In-
deed, the literature has well examined the impact of initial conditions|especially,
initial size|on rm survival. Some studies have found the positive eect of initial
size on rm survival (e.g., Audretsch and Mahmood, 1995). For instance, Agar-
wal and Audretsch (2001) provided evidence that small rms are confronted with a
lower likelihood of survival than their larger counterparts using data on US rms.
In contrast, Disney et al. (2003) showed the positive impact of initial size on the exit
hazard for single establishments using data on UK rms (establishments), but the
negative impact of current size on the exit hazard. Additionally, Coad et al. (2013)
identied the signicant negative impact of initial size on survival when controlling
for lagged size. At the same time, some studies have addressed the impact of initial
conditions on rm survival over time. For instance, Geroski et al. (2010) concluded
that the impact of initial conditions on survival does not diminish rapidly over the
rst 5{10 years of a new rm's life, using data on Portuguese rms. Together, these
ndings suggest that whereas the impact of initial conditions may gradually disap-
3Based on ndings from new bank start-ups in the US, Bamford et al. (2000) addressed the
issues on new venture performance from three perspectives|external control, strategic choice, and
resource|and emphasized that initial founding conditions and decisions are important.
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pear over time, initial conditions continue to play a critical role in the post-entry
performance of rms.
While many studies have focused on initial size, a few have paid attention to the
impact of initial nancial conditions on rm survival. In seminal work, Cooper et al.
(1994) found that the level of capitalization, as measured by the total amount of cap-
ital invested at the time of rst sale, contributes to marginal survival and growth
using data on US rms (entrepreneurs). Then, Huyghebaert and Van de Gucht
(2004) argued that the interaction between the nature of industry competition and
a rm's initial debt ratio is highly important for explaining exit. Using data on
Belgian rms, Huyghebaert and Van de Gucht found that entrepreneurial start-ups
in highly competitive industries are more likely to exit and that leverage compounds
this exit risk. Elsewhere, Huynh et al. (2010, 2012) investigated the impact of initial
nancial conditions|more precisely, the debt-to-asset ratio|on the duration of new
entrants in the Canadian manufacturing industry, and identied a non-monotonic
relationship between rm hazard and leverage (as measured by the debt-to-asset
ratio). Additionally, Stucki (2014) found that rm survival and the achievement of
prot break-even are negatively correlated with nancial constraints using data on
Swiss rms. Overall, these studies suggest that initial nancial conditions, including
leverage and nancial constraints, matter for the post-entry performance of rms.4
Unlike the above studies, several studies on the survival of rms have considered
dierent exit routes (e.g., Harho et al., 1998). Indeed, exit may include several
forms other than business failure (bankruptcy), including voluntary liquidation and
merger. In particular, we can regard exit through merger and acquisition (M&A) in
part as a successful exit strategy, even though the rm ceases to exist in the market.
Clearly, the impact of initial nancial conditions may dier across these alterna-
tive exit routes. For instance, Grilli et al. (2010) found the dierent antecedents
of the eects of rm size and age between closure and M&A using data on Italian
4Cassar (2004) examined the determinants of capital structure and types of nancing for start-
up rms and found that the larger the start-up rm, the greater the proportion of debt, long-term
debt, outside nancing, and bank nancing. However, Cassar did not address the impact of initial
nancial conditions on the post-entry performance.
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high-tech rms. As for the case of Japanese start-up rms, Kato and Honjo (2015)
identied dierences in the eect of entrepreneurs' human capital on survival and
exit between exit routes comprising failure (bankruptcy) and nonfailure (voluntary
liquidation and merger) outcomes. Overall, the ndings of these studies suggest that
the determinants of exit depend on the exit route itself. Ignoring these dierences
would place us in danger of misunderstanding the post-entry performance of rms.
However, to our understanding, few empirical studies have examined the dierences
in the impact of initial conditions on the post-entry performance of rms across the
variety of possible exit routes.
2.3. Hypotheses development
As already indicated, capital market imperfections enable start-up rms, including
those with growth potential, to commence business with insucient capital because
of information asymmetries between entrepreneurs and external suppliers of capital.
In this regard, small rms may be particularly susceptible to a cost disadvantage
through diseconomies of scale. In addition, transaction and agency costs arising
from information asymmetries are arguably more severe for small rms. Conversely,
it is conceivable that rms with a suciently large initial size do not suer from
such cost disadvantages. Therefore, these rms are more likely to avoid failure in
the market. Indeed, and as discussed, some studies have already found that initial
size exerts a positive impact on rm survival (e.g., Audretsch and Mahmood, 1995;
Agarwal and Audretsch, 2001).
In contrast, other studies have identied the negative eect of initial size on rm
survival (e.g., Disney et al., 2003). For instance, Coad et al. (2013) suggested that a
small start-up size enhances survival because of high growth since start-up. However,
these results concerning initial size have generally used the size of employment or
sales. It is therefore unclear how initial nancial conditions aect the post-entry
performance of rms.5
5In terms of the capital size of Japanese start-up rms, Honjo (2000) found the negative eect
of paid-in capital on the likelihood of failure. However, the covariate for paid-in capital was current
size, not initial size.
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With respect to initial nancial conditions, the debt ratio (leverage) is considered
an important determinant of survival and exit. Outside the literature on start-up
rms, Zingales (1998) found that highly leveraged rms are less likely to survive.
As for start-up rms, Huynh et al. (2012) observed a positive relationship between
initial leverage (the debt-to-asset ratio) and hazard rates, indicating that rms with
higher levels of initial leverage are less likely to survive. To achieve sucient capital
size, start-up rms with less equity nancing are compelled to rely on debt nancing.
As Robb and Robinson (2012) argued, start-up rms certainly tend to rely heavily
on outside debt. However, if start-up rms achieve a sucient capital size through
debt nancing, they may also have a higher probability of failure because of the
additional nancial burden of interest payments and credit constraints. For this
reason, there is the possibility that the likelihood of failure increases with the initial
debt size.
How start-up rms raise their initial capital plays a critical role in rm survival.
To reduce the possibility of failure, start-up rms should use equity nancing, rather
than debt nancing. In this respect, we consider that the initial leverage structure|
conversely, initial equity ratio|has a signicant impact on the survival of start-up
rms and so we test the following hypothesis:
H1: Start-up rms that rely more on equity than debt nancing are less
likely to fail within a shorter period.
Regarding initial equity nancing, regulations governing a minimum paid-in cap-
ital requirement|more precisely, paid-in capital of no less than 10 million yen for
a joint-stock company|was in place in Japan in and after April 1990, as a means
of increasing initial equity nancing, even for small and medium-sized enterprises.
Consequently, because of the regulations, entrepreneurs could not found joint-stock
companies without 10 million yen in capital. However, this requirement was removed
when the new Companies Act was introduced in May 2006. The regulations, which
were in eect from April 1991 through to April 2006, may have weakened the eect
of the initial equity ratio on the post-entry performance of rms because it created
an incentive for entrepreneurs to intentionally raise equity nancing. In contrast,
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the negative eect of the initial equity ratio may be greater following the abolition
of the regulations. In this paper, we investigate the impact of the minimum paid-in
capital requirement on the post-entry performance of rms and test the following
hypothesis:
H2: The negative eect of the initial capital ratio on the likelihood
of failure is greater following the abolition of regulations governing a
minimum paid-in capital requirement.
As discussed, we should also pay more attention to the possible exit routes
when examining the factors aecting rm survival. More specically, exit through
merger diers substantially from failure, even though the rms in either case are both
extinct. As already mentioned, the determinants depend on the exit route, such as
failure and merger, and the impact of initial nancial conditions may dier between
the exit routes. Regarding the relationship between equity nancing and merger,
M&A is considered an extension of equity nancing, as equity nancing is typically
associated with a loss of ownership. Therefore, start-up rms relying on equity
nancing are subject to takeover and merger. For comparison, we investigate the
dierences in the exit routes, dividing exits into failure and merger. We argue that
while start-up rms that rely more on equity nancing are less likely to fail within
a shorter period, they are also more likely to be targeted as merger candidates. In
this paper, we test the following hypothesis:
H3: Start-up rms that rely more on equity than debt nancing are
more likely to exit through merger.
To test the above three main hypotheses, we present the data and model used in
the empirical analysis in the following sections.
3. Data
3.1. Data source
The data used in this analysis come from a database compiled by Teikoku Data-
bank, Ltd. (TDB), which is one of the major credit investigation companies in Japan
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(comparable to Dun & Bradstreet in the US). This database is composed of nancial
statements as prepared using on Japanese Generally Accepted Accounting Principles
(GAAP). We obtained data on unconsolidated nancial statements in the initial ac-
counting year when rms commenced business. Using this database, we constructed
a data set to identify those factors aecting the survival and exit of start-up rms.
We dene start-up rms as rms founded during the period from January 1995
to December 2010. To observe the event of exit, we set up an observation window
in the period from January 1995 to January 2011; that is, we observed the duration
of survival from one month (for rms founded in December 2010) to 192 months
(for rms founded in January 1995). This observation period is set before the Great
East Japan Earthquake in March 2011. Using the classication in TDB, we divided
the exit routes into three types: failure, merger, and other.6
In Japan, there are several legal forms of business, including sole proprietor-
ships, partnerships, and joint-stock companies. Of these, joint-stock companies are
the most typical form of a limited liability company, while sole proprietorships and
partnerships are generally considered to be privately held. Accordingly, we focus
only on joint-stock companies, partly because most databases do not suciently
provide accounting data for sole proprietorships and partnerships. At the same
time, this enables us to examine how the regulations governing a minimum paid-in
capital requirement, which applied to joint-stock companies, aects the duration of
survival.
As a result, the data set of start-up rms contains joint-stock companies founded
from January 1995 to December 2010. The data set covers rms in the industrial sec-
tors of construction, manufacturing, information and communications (ICT), whole-
sale and retail trade, and business services. This contrasts with some earlier studies
that focused on start-up rms only in the manufacturing sector (e.g., Huyghebaert et
6TDB provided information on the date of bankruptcy and we measured the duration of failure
(bankruptcy) using the period from the date of foundation to the date of bankruptcy. It is important
to note that bankrupt rms do not always exit the market and a few may actually survive through
debt forgiveness. However, in practice, most bankrupt rms are liquidated and bankruptcy can be
clearly regarded as an unsuccessful outcome. Therefore, in this analysis, failure (bankruptcy) is
regarded as an exit route.
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al., 2007). However, as Harho et al. (1998) emphasized, it is particularly important
that the data set includes all major industries because of the growing importance of
the service sector in industrialized countries. In practice, ICT and business services
rather than manufacturing have attracted most new entrants in recent years. For
this reason, we focus not only on manufacturing, but also on other industrial sec-
tors.7
Several measurement issues arise when we construct our data set. First, be-
cause we were unable to obtain nancial statements at the date of foundation, we
instead used them in the rst accounting year.8 Second, the data set contains some
subsidiaries and aliated rms. As these rms may have very dierent capital struc-
tures from independent rms, we excluded from the data set those rms regarded
as subsidiaries and aliated rms by TDB. Additionally, we excluded only one rm
from the data set because xed assets were negative. Finally, the data set contains
only a few rms of a large size. Although these rms may be de novo entrants, we
considered rms with 100 employees or more in the rst accounting year as outliers
and likewise excluded them from the data set.9
As a result, the sample consists of 16,181 joint-stock companies founded during
the period of 1995{2010 in Japanese industries.10 Table 1 details the distribution
of start-up rms in the sample, which also indicates the trend in the number of
failures and mergers. As shown in Table 1, up until January 2011, 832 rms (5.1%)
7From the data set, we exclude rms in highly regulated industries and those in relatively
unimportant sectors, including agriculture and forestry, sheries, mining, nance and insurance,
personal services, and public services.
8In this case, accounting months dier between rms, and therefore, the period of the rst
accounting year|more precisely, the number of months from the date of foundation to the rst
accounting date|is not equal in length across rms. To identify whether initial nancial conditions
depend on the period of the rst accounting year, we regressed initial nancial conditions, used as
covariates in this paper, on this period. However, as we did not identify any signicant relationship
between this period and the initial nancial conditions, we specied data in the rst accounting
year as representing the initial nancial conditions.
9In the original data set, there are 120 start-up rms (0.7% of the sample) with 100 employees
or more in the rst accounting year.
10The percentages of start-up rms by industry are 52% (construction), 4% (manufacturing), 11%
(ICT), 19% (wholesale and retail trade), and 14% (business services and others). As an aside, we
note the relatively large number of construction rms in the nal data set. This is because databases
compiled by credit investigation companies (i.e., TDB) tend to target construction rms for credit
investigation and construction rms tend to disclose their nancial statements more readily to
enable them to receive public works.
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experienced failure (bankruptcy), while 437 rms (2.7%) exited the market through
merger.11
3.2. Method
We apply a survival analysis approach when estimating the determinants of exit.
However, as already mentioned, exit can entail multiple types. To take into account
these dierent possible exit routes, we employ a competing risks regression.
Let Tij denote the time to event j for rm i, and Tij is observed at t when
Tij  t.12 However, the time to event j is not always observed for all rms during
the observation period. In other words, right censoring is common. Let Ci denote
the censoring time, that is, the period to the end of the observation period for rm
i. The censoring time, Ci, varies depending on the date of foundation of rm i and
the end of the observation period, and Tij is observed if Tij  Ci. In addition, a
competing event may occur prior to event j. Here, let ~Tij denote the time to the
competing event for rm i. Because of the occurrence of the competing event, either
Tij or ~Tij can be observed for rm i. More precisely, we observe event j or the
competing event when minfTij ; ~Tijg  Ci.
Following Gray (1988) and Fine and Gray (1999), we formalize a subdistribution









where a ^ b denotes minfa; bg. To estimate the determinants of event j, we assume
that its subdistribution hazard is written by





where xi is a vector of rm i's covariates aecting the event of interest,  is a vector
of the estimated parameters, and j0(t) is the baseline subhazard.
11We classied 80 rms (0.5%) as \other," which indicates voluntary liquidation without
bankruptcy or merger, and included them in the sample. However, unlike Kato and Honjo (2015),
we did not examine the determinants of voluntary liquidation in this analysis.
12In this analysis, t is measured by rm age and t = 0 at the date of foundation. That is, the
duration indicates how long rm i survives in the market after the date of foundation.
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There are two events of interest (failure and merger) in this analysis. Using the
subdistribution hazards for failure and merger, we examine the factors aecting the
likelihood of failure and merger for start-up rms.
3.3. Covariates
Following the hypotheses discussed in Section 2, we dene covariates aecting the
subdistribution hazard of failure and merger among start-up rms. To capture the
initial capital size, we dene a covariate (lnTF ) as the logarithm of total nancing
in the rst accounting year. In this analysis, total nancing is measured by the
sum of debt and equity nancing. Additionally, a covariate for initial equity size
(lnE), which does not include debt nancing, is dened as the logarithm of equity
nancing.13
To test H1 and H3, we use a covariate for the initial equity ratio (E=TF ),
dened as the ratio of equity nancing to total nancing in the rst accounting
year. However, given that reported equity in nancial statements includes retained
earnings, it is likely that equity overestimates the eect of initial capital size on fail-
ure. Therefore, following Huyghebaert and Van de Gucht (2004), we do not include
retained earnings in equity nancing. Additionally, liabilities include various ac-
counting items, such as accrued expenses and allowances, which dier considerably
from debt nancing as raised from capital markets. Accordingly, we restrict debt
nancing to short- and long-term loans, commercial paper, and corporate bonds,
not total liabilities (debt).14
As discussed, regulations governing a minimum paid-in capital requirement were
in place in Japan between April 1990 and April 2006. To identify the impact of the
regulations on rm survival, we specify an interaction term between equity nancing
and the regulation period, as measured by a dummy variable representing the pe-
riod after the enforcement of the new Companies Act (NOREQ), in the regression
13It would be interesting to highlight the composition of equity nancing. However, we were
unable to classify equity nancing into dierent types of ownership, such as individual investors
and venture capital, using the available data.
14Likewise, we do not include trade credit in debt nancing because it is dicult to determine
whether trade credit is debt nancing as raised from capital markets.
13
model.
In addition to debt and equity nancing, we employ a covariate for initial capital
expenditures (CAPEX) to identify the eect of asset structure on rm survival, as
measured by xed assets, including intangible xed assets. This is because, given
that capital expenditures tend to generate illiquid assets, it is plausible that start-up
rms with higher capital expenditures have a higher risk of failure in the market.
As is often argued, innovative rms are more likely to rely on external nanc-
ing than less innovative rms because of more attractive investment opportunities
(e.g., Aghion et al., 2004). However, as R&D projects have a higher risk, it is not
easy for start-up rms to raise funding for R&D investment from external suppliers
of capital. Further, as Carpenter and Petersen (2002) emphasized, physical invest-
ments designed to embody R&D results are likely to be rm specic and therefore
have little collateral value. In addition, Czarnitzki and Hottenrott (2011) argued
that start-up rms are more nancially constrained because they cannot use earlier
prot accumulations for nancing their R&D projects. Honjo et al. (2014) therefore
concluded that these features of R&D prevent start-up rms from accessing capital
markets. Because of the high risk of R&D projects and their less valuable assets,
we hypothesize that innovative start-up rms are more likely to fail within a shorter
period. We specify a dummy variable (RD) to identify R&D-oriented start-ups.
It is also possible that industry conditions, such as industry growth and demand,
aect the post-entry performance of rms. To control for the dierence in indus-
try conditions, we specify dummy variables for construction, manufacturing, ICT,
wholesale and retail industries in the regression model.
Furthermore, the sample comprises start-up rms for which the year of entry dif-
fers across rms. Because start-up rms in the sample do not necessarily commence
business at the same time, they may then face dierent macroeconomic conditions.
To control for these dierences in entry timing between rms, we include entry co-
hort dummies in the regression model. The cohort dummies represent the year of
entry of the rms in the sample.15
15Essentially, we dene the cohort dummies on a one-year period basis. However, we do not
observe the failure of rms founded in 2010 and the merger of rms founded in 2009 and 2010 until
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Table 2 lists the denitions of the covariates. We measure the covariates, lnTF ,
lnE, E=TF , CAPEX, and RD, based on the rst accounting year after the date
of the rm's foundation. Table 3 presents the descriptive statistics of the covariates
used in the analysis and those of the debt and equity nancing. Table 3 shows that
the mean of debt nancing (approximately 22 million yen) is larger than that of
equity nancing (approximately 14 million yen), while the mean of E=TF indicates
that debt nancing accounts for more than half of total nancing upon start-up.
4. Estimation results
4.1. Failure
We estimate the determinants of failure and merger using the competing risks regres-
sion based on rm age. Table 4 presents the estimated coecients of the covariates
(^) for failure. While we use the covariate for initial capital size (lnTF ) and initial
equity size (lnE) in columns (i) and (ii), respectively, we use the covariate for the
initial equity ratio (E=TF ) in column (iii). Additionally, the interaction terms of
lnE and NOREQ and of E=TF and NOREQ are included in columns (iv) and (v),
respectively.
As shown in Table 4, the coecients of lnTF are positive in column (i), indicat-
ing that start-up rms with a larger initial capital size are more likely to fail within
a shorter period. The results are consistent with Coad et al. (2013) who found a
signicant negative eect on rm survival when controlling for lagged size. In addi-
tion, the coecients of lnE are insignicant in column (ii). As a result, we nd little
evidence that initial equity size has a signicant eect on the likelihood of failure.16
These results indicate that a small start-up size enhances survival and that start-up
rms cannot decrease the likelihood of failure by increasing their initial capital size.
In contrast, the coecients of E=TF are negative at the 1% signicance level in
column (iii). The results reveal that start-up rms that rely more on equity nanc-
January 2011. Therefore, in this case, we use a combined dummy, being the cohort dummy for rms
founded during the periods of 2009{2010 and 2008{2010, to obtain the estimates in the regression
model.
16Even when we measure initial equity size using paid-in capital, we do not obtain a negative
relationship between failure and initial equity size.
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ing are less likely to fail within a shorter period and we provide evidence to support
H1. In other words, start-up rms that rely more on debt nancing are more likely
to fail.17 Although start-up rms tend to rely on debt nancing when commencing
business, as our ndings suggest, the likelihood of failure increases with the ratio
of debt nancing. This is presumably because interest payments are more likely to
become a nancial burden during the start-up period. To reduce the probability of
bankruptcy, start-up rms should secure equity nancing rather than debt nanc-
ing, which will result in more stable businesses.
While the interaction term between lnE and NOREQ is insignicant in column
(iv), that of E=TF and NOREQ is negative at the 5% signicance level in column
(v). These results reveal that while initial equity size does not aect the likelihood
of failure, the negative eect of the initial equity size and the equity ratio on the like-
lihood of failure increases in the absence of a minimum paid-in capital requirement.
This provides evidence supportive of H2. The ndings indicate that the negative
eect of the initial equity ratio on the likelihood of failure is greater following the
abolition of this requirement. Conversely, we can say that the initial equity ratio
did not exert a more signicant eect on rm survival when regulations governing a
minimum paid-in capital requirement were in place. This may be because start-up
rms intentionally raised equity nancing to achieve the minimum paid-in capital
requirement.18 These ndings imply that start-up rms can raise equity nancing
more eectively without regulations governing a minimum paid-in capital require-
ment.
The coecients of CAPEX are positive at least at the 5% signicance level in all
of the columns in Table 4. Overall, we nd that start-up rms with higher capital
expenditures are more likely to fail within a shorter period. The results indicate
17Musso and Schiavo (2008) found that nancial constraints, as measured by a synthetic index,
signicantly increase the probability of exiting the market. We also measured nancial constraints
using several other covariates, including the ratio of cash ow to total assets, and identied a
negative relationship between failure and cash ow.
18In practice, rms with paid-in capital of 10 million yen account for about 71% of the sample
rms founded from January 1995 to April 2006, but only for about 7% of the sample rms founded
from May 2006 to December 2010. This implies that most rms raised equity nancing simply to
achieve the minimum paid-in capital requirement.
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that as capital expenditures increase at start-up, rms lose liquidity. Therefore,
start-up rms that invest heavily in xed assets may face diculties in surviving.
Furthermore, the coecients of RD are positive, but not suciently signicant. We
thus do not identify the eect of R&D investment on the likelihood of failure.19
4.2. Merger
Table 5 presents the estimated coecients of the covariates for merger, correspond-
ing to those for failure shown in Table 4.
As shown in Table 5, the coecients of lnTF are positive at the 1% signicance
level in column (i). The coecients of lnE are also positive at the 1% signicance
level in column (ii). Accordingly, we nd that initial equity size has a positive eect
on exit through merger, which diers from the ndings in Table 4. The results indi-
cate that start-up rms with larger initial capital are more likely to exit the market
through merger.
The coecients of E=TF are positive at the 1% signicance level in column (iii).
The results reveal that start-up rms that rely more on equity nancing are more
likely to exit through merger within a shorter period and we provide evidence to
support H3. While the initial equity ratio has a negative eect on failure in Table
4, it has a positive eect on merger in Table 5. We thus obtain evidence that the
determinants of exit depend on the exit route itself and that the initial equity ratio
decreases the likelihood of failure, but increases the likelihood of merger. These
ndings suggest that start-up rms with a higher ratio of equity nancing are more
likely to be targeted for merger. We also conjecture that rms that can establish
their capital structures using equity nancing at start-up may have more opportuni-
ties to seek a strategic exit through merger. In this respect, the ndings imply that
initial capital structure determines the future exit route. More specically, start-up
rms relying more on equity nancing are more likely to rely on equity markets.
In this respect, path dependence in nancing structure is a signicant feature in
19As an alternative, we could use R&D intensity, as measured by the ratio of R&D expenditures
to sales. In practice, we did not obtain signicant results when using the covariate for R&D
intensity. This is partly because most start-up rms do not suciently have R&D expenditures
when commencing business.
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determining the post-entry performance of rms.
Meanwhile, the interaction term between lnE and NOREQ and that between
E=TF and NOREQ are insignicant in columns (iv) and (v). We thus provide little
evidence that the eects of the initial equity size and the equity ratio depend on the
presence or absence of a minimum paid-in capital requirement. The results indicate
that start-up rms that rely more on equity nancing are more likely to be targeted
for merger, irrespective of such regulations.
The coecients of CAPEX are negative at the 1% signicance level in columns
(i), (ii), and (iv). The results indicate that start-up rms with higher capital expen-
ditures are less likely to exit through merger. Accordingly, these ndings suggest
that start-up rms that invest heavily in xed assets have fewer opportunities to
merge. Finally, the coecients of RD are negative but insignicant, suggesting no
eect of R&D investment on exit through merger.20
5. Conclusions
Using a survival analysis approach, this paper investigated the impact of initial -
nancial conditions on the post-entry performance of rms. We examined whether
initial nancial conditions aect the duration of survival among start-up rms in
Japan, distinguishing between failure and merger. We provided evidence that start-
up rms that rely more on equity than debt nancing are less likely to fail within a
shorter period, but we found little evidence that initial equity size has a signicant
eect on the likelihood of failure. Moreover, we found the negative eect of equity
nancing on the likelihood of failure to be greater for start-up rms founded follow-
ing the abolition of regulations governing a minimum paid-in capital requirement.
20Agarwal and Audretsch (2001) found that the patterns of the hazard rates dier substantially
across the dierent environments dened by life cycle stage. In particular, mergers may occur in
industries with growth potential because acquiring rms have an incentive to expand their business
in that industry. To capture the dierences in growth and demand in the life cycle stages across
industries, we also used a proxy for industry growth potential, as measured by the median industry's
market-to-book (MTB) ratio in the industry based on the two-digit Standard Industrial Classica-
tion. A a result, we found that industry MTB exerts a signicantly positive eect on the likelihood
of merger, while we did not nd any signicant eect on the likelihood of failure. This suggests
that start-up rms are more likely to exit through merger in industries with a higher demand for
investment, such that established rms seek suitable targets for M&A.
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Furthermore, the results revealed that start-up rms with larger initial equity are
more likely to exit through merger. Overall, the ndings suggest that initial capital
structure is a critical determinant of exit route.
Of course, there are several limitations in this analysis. To start, we did not
discuss which sources rms select to obtain their capital at start-up. In other words,
we paid little attention to corporate governance because of the lack of information
about the ownership structure of start-up rms. In addition, we focused only on
initial nancial conditions taken from nancial statements in the rst accounting
year and we would need longitudinal data tracing changes in capital structure to
elaborate upon these ndings. However, this may result in selection bias because
rms are less likely to provide their nancial statements immediately prior to exit.
Nonetheless, further development of this analysis would certainly provide greater in-
sights into post-entry performance, and into precisely how start-up rms raise funds
for their survival.
Despite these limitations, we contribute to providing new insights into how initial
nancial conditions matter for the survival of start-up rms. To date, there has been
much attention in the literature on the eect of rm size on survival and growth for
testing Gibrat's law. Interestingly, we have provided evidence on the impact of ini-
tial capital structure, rather than initial capital size, on the post-entry performance
of rms. Specically, the initial equity ratio exerts a greater inuence without reg-
ulations governing a minimum paid-in capital requirement. This implies that we
could obtain more eective initial nancing through easing unnecessary regulations
on business start-ups. Furthermore, our ndings indicate that the determinants of
survival and exit dier according to exit route. In particular, we shed light on how
the eects of initial nancial conditions dier between failure and merger. This
also implies that start-up rms establish their capital structures when commencing
business, and that those rms that rely more on equity nancing may have better
opportunities for a strategic exit, such as in the form of merger.
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Appendix
First, we present the estimated subhazard ratios (exp(x0i^)) for failure and merger
in Tables A1 and A2, respectively. These tables correspond to the estimated coe-
cients for failure and merger shown in Tables 4 and 5.
Then, for robustness, we consider a few modications in the estimation. We re-
strict the subsample to start-up rms with paid-in capital of no less than 10 million
yen in the rst accounting year without regard to the foundation date and estimate
the regression models. As shown in Table 1, the number of start-up rms in the
sample increased from 2006. This is because, as already mentioned, the regulations
governing a minimum paid-in capital requirement was abolished in May 2006 when
the new Companies Act was introduced and rms with paid-in capital of less than
10 million yen could be founded as joint-stock companies. Therefore, there is the
possibility that the smaller paid-in capital of start-up rms founded in and after
May 2006 signicantly aected the results in Tables 4 and 5.
Table A3 presents the estimation results for failure and merger when we restrict
the subsample to start-up rms with paid-in capital of no less than 10 million yen
without regard to the foundation date, following the regression models in columns
(iii) and (v) of Tables 4 and 5. The results in Table A3 are almost consistent with
those in Tables 4 and 5, and therefore our ndings about initial nancial conditions
are robust regardless of smaller paid-in capital. We also nd that the interaction
term between initial nancial conditions and regulations governing a minimum paid-
in capital requirement has a signicant eect at the 5% level in column (ii) of Table
A3.
In addition, Table A4 presents the estimation results for failure and merger
when we restrict the subsample to start-up rms in industries other than construc-
tion, following the regression models in columns (iii) and (v) of Tables 4 and 5. This
is because, as already shown, start-up rms in the construction sector account for
more than half of the rms in the sample and there is the possibility that the results
in Tables 4 and 5 depend heavily on conditions in the construction sector. However,
20
the results in Table A4 are almost consistent with those in Tables 4 and 5, and
therefore our ndings are robust in the absence of rms in the construction sector
from the sample. However, the coecients of RD are, in part, signicant concerning
the likelihood of failure. As start-up rms in the construction sector are less likely
to invest in R&D, we do not nd any signicant relationships in Tables 4 and 5.
Finally, Table A5 presents the estimation results including the time-variant co-
ecients, following the regression models in columns (iii) and (v) of Tables 4 and
5. We identify the signicant eects of initial nancial conditions, as measured by
the initial equity size and the equity ratio for failure and merger, respectively. As
Geroski et al. (2010) found, it is likely that the eect of initial conditions decreases as
time goes by. Accordingly, we examine how the eects of initial conditions diminish
over time using time-variant covariates, with interaction terms between E=TF and
t included in columns (i) and (iii), and E=TF and log t are included in columns (ii)
and (iv) of Table A5. In terms of failure, as shown in Table A5, the time-variant
coecients of E=TF are positive at the 5% signicance level. Thus, while the initial
equity ratio has a negative eect on the likelihood of failure, we nd that its eect
decreases over time, which is consistent with the ndings of Geroski et al. Addition-
ally, in terms of merger, the time-variant coecients of E=TF are positive, although
the coecients of E=TF are insignicant. We do not provide sucient evidence that
the eects of initial nancial conditions on exit through merger diminish over time.
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Table 1. Distribution of start-up rms in the sample
Year Entry Exit
Failure Merger Other Survival
1995 461 0 0 0 461
1996 560 1 0 0 920
1997 438 4 3 0 1,351
1998 465 12 4 0 1,800
1999 518 20 8 0 2,290
2000 568 28 11 0 2,819
2001 480 50 21 0 3,228
2002 480 41 37 0 3,630
2003 504 50 31 0 4,053
2004 505 60 46 4 4,448
2005 531 60 36 5 4,878
2006 1,889 60 47 5 6,655
2007 2,376 85 48 9 8,889
2008 2,456 116 61 14 11,154
2009 2,261 123 49 15 13,228
2010 1,689 110 35 25 14,747
Jan. 2011 |{ 12 0 3 14,732
Total 16; 181 832 437 80





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 3. Descriptive statistics
Covariate Mean SD 25% Median 75%
D 22; 140 153; 896 0 4; 690 13; 746
E 14; 174 137; 537 3; 000 6; 000 10; 000
lnTF 9:499 1:177 8:865 9:393 10:111
lnE 8:626 1:212 8:006 8:700 9:210
E=TF 0:569 0:341 0:260 0:529 1:000
CAPEX 0:174 0:200 0:026 0:100 0:249
RD 0:076 |{ |{ |{ |{
NOREQ 0:650 |{ |{ |{ |{
Note: SD indicates the standard deviation. The number of observations is 16,181.
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Table 4. Estimation results for failure
Failure
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v)











CAPEX 0:406 0:581 0:374 0:580 0:380
(0.178) (0.168) (0.179) (0.168) (0.179)
RD 0:152 0:172 0:161 0:170 0:162
(0.113) (0.112) (0.113) (0.112) (0.113)
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Entry cohort dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 16; 181 16; 181 16; 181 16; 181 16; 181
Number of events 832 832 832 832 832
Number of competing events 517 517 517 517 517
Log pseudolikelihood  7; 028  7; 034  7; 023  7; 032  7; 017
Wald 2 91:2 67:4 96:9 70:4 88:9
Note: Figures in parentheses are standard errors. ***, **, and * indicate signicance at the
1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
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Table 5. Estimation results for merger
Merger
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v)











CAPEX  1:575  1:188  0:288  1:188  0:287
(0.313) (0.330) (0.305) (0.330) (0.305)
RD  0:302  0:261  0:132  0:261  0:132
(0.175) (0.176) (0.174) (0.176) (0.174)
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Entry cohort dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 16; 181 16; 181 16; 181 16; 181 16; 181
Number of events 437 437 437 437 437
Number of competing events 912 912 912 912 912
Log pseudolikelihood  3; 578  3; 548  3; 669  3; 548  3:669
Wald 2 406 466 167 470 169
Note: Figures in parentheses are standard errors. ***, **, and * indicate signicance at the
1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
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Table A1. Estimation results for failure: subhazard ratios
Failure
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v)











CAPEX 1:427 1:787 1:453 1:786 1:461
(0.247) (0.300) (0.261) (0.300) (0.262)
RD 1:160 1:188 1:175 1:186 1:176
(0.130) (0.134) (0.132) (0.133) (0.132)
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Entry cohort dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 16; 181 16; 181 16; 181 16; 181 16; 181
Number of events 832 832 832 832 832
Number of competing events 517 517 517 517 517
Log pseudolikelihood  7; 031  7; 034  7; 023  7; 032  7; 017
Wald 2 87:0 67:4 96:9 70:4 89:0
Note: Figures in parentheses are standard errors. SHR indicates the estimated subhazard
ratio. ***, **, and * indicate signicance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
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Table A2. Estimation results for merger: subhazard ratios
Merger
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v)











CAPEX 0:216 0:305 0:750 0:305 0:750
(0.068) (0.101) (0.229) (0.101) (0.229)
RD 0:740 0:770 0:877 0:770 0:877
(0.128) (0.135) (0.153) (0.135) (0.153)
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Entry cohort dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 16; 181 16; 181 16; 181 16; 181 16; 181
Number of events 437 437 437 437 437
Number of competing events 912 912 912 912 912
Log pseudolikelihood  3; 611  3; 548  3; 669  3; 548  3; 669
Wald 2 310 466 167 470 169
Note: Figures in parentheses are standard errors. SHR indicates the estimated subhazard
ratio. ***, **, and * indicate signicance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
31
Table A3. Estimation results for failure and merger: subsample of start-up rms
with paid-in capital of no less than 10 million yen
Failure Merger
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv)
Covariate Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef.
E=TF  0:475  0:450 0:483 0:494
(0.117) (0.118) (0.187) (0.187)
E=TF NOREQ  1:350  0:660
(0.670) (0.743)
CAPEX 0:359 0:361 0:360  0:358
(0.183) (0.183) (0.312) (0.312)
RD 0:139 0:139  0:145  0:145
(0.116) (0.116) (0.177) (0.177)
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Entry cohort dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 6; 772 6; 772 6; 772 6; 772
Number of events 781 781 427 427
Number of competing events 507 507 861 861
Log pseudolikelihood  6; 479  6; 477  3; 551  3; 551
Wald 2 46:9 50:3 95:9 98:6
Note: Figures in parentheses are standard errors. ***, **, and * indicate signicance at the
1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
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Table A4. Estimation results for failure and merger: subsample of start-up rms in
the manufacturing, ICT, wholesale and retail trade, and service sectors
Failure Merger
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv)
Covariate Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef.
E=TF  0:429  0:345 0:490 0:490
(0.151) (0.157) (0.203) (0.209)
E=TF NOREQ  1:097 1:0 10 4
(0.524) 　　　 　 (0.733)
CAPEX 0:538 0:537 0:154 0:154
(0.220) (0.220) (0.301) (0.301)
RD 0:302 0:301  0:322  0:322
(0.141) (0.141) (0.211) (0.211)
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Entry cohort dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 7; 709 7; 709 7; 709 7; 709
Number of events 459 459 340 340
Number of competing events 394 394 513 513
Log pseudolikelihood  3; 615  3; 613  2; 699  2; 699
Wald 2 52:9 54:6 58:9 59:3
Note: Figures in parentheses are standard errors. ***, **, and * indicate signicance at the
1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
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Table A5. Estimation results including time-variant covariates for failure and merger
Failure Merger
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv)
Covariate Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef.
E=TF  0:976  2:652  0:234  1:523
(0.238) (0.835) (0.402) (1.318)
E=TF  t 0:006 0:011
(0.003) (0.005)
E=TF  lnt 0:509 0:504
(0.199) (0.321)
CAPEX 0:373 0:373  0:294  0:292
(0.179) (0.179) (0.305) (0.305)
RD 0:161 0:161  0:133  0:132
(0.113) (0.113) (0.174) (0.174)
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Entry cohort dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 16; 181 16; 181 16; 181 16; 181
Number of events 832 832 437 437
Number of competing events 517 517 912 912
Log pseudolikelihood  7; 021  7; 020  3; 666  3; 668
Wald 2 106 110 174 174
Note: Figures in parentheses are standard errors. ***, **, and * indicate signicance at the
1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
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